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ABSTRACT: This paper is intended as an admiring, but ultimately critical, examination of 
Badiou’s metaphysics and its grounding in his politics. I have chosen to examine these 
dimensions of his thought for two interrelated reasons. Firstly, while Badiou’s metaphysics may 
be his most original contribution to continental philosophy, he remains far more famous for his 
voluminous contributions to radical left wing thought. It is therefore important to introduce the 
philosophical grounding for his positions to as more general audience. Secondly, Badiou’s 
metaphysical tomes are famously dense and often difficult to summarize. Part of this is due to 
his use of complex mathematics and mathematical terms, and part of it is due to his 
occasionally unclear writing style. Grounding Badiou’s metaphysics in an analysis of his politics 
help us better see what the point of the former is, while demonstrating the systematic nature of 
his philosophical architecture more fully. 
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INTRODUCTION2 
Since the publication of Being and Event3 in 1988, Alain Badiou has established himself 
as inarguably the most ambitious philosopher in the Continental tradition in quite 
some time.  His rapidly growing oeuvre has come to encompass metaphysics, ethics, 
politics, art, cinema and more.  Badiou has truly taken it upon himself to build and 
defend a genuine philosophical system (once a faux pas par excellence) intended to 
stand next the great architectural edifices of Hegel, Kant, and of course Plato.  The 
                                                          
1 Parts of this paper were originally published in a different format in Critical Legal Thinking.  They have 
been republished and altered with permission.  
2 My colleague Christopher Satoor was helpful in reading over earlier iterations of this paper. 
3 See Alain Badiou. Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham. (London, UK. Continuum Press, 2005) 
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result has been something of a philosophical scandal, with some scholars beholden to 
the skepticism of “democratic materialism” reacting critically, while others who long 
for a system have taken Badiou at his word that he is the real deal.4 
All this makes thorough engagement with his work ever more important, especially 
as his influence on a new generation of continental philosophers becomes ever more 
apparent.5 In the English speaking world, many of Badiou’s works have been translated 
slowly and in some cases only quite recently. This makes the necessity of a systematic 
engagement with his work all the more critical.  This paper is intended as an admiring, 
but ultimately critical, examination of Badiou’s metaphysics and its grounding in his 
politics.  I have chosen to examine these dimensions of his thought for two interrelated 
reasons.  Firstly, while Badiou’s metaphysics may be his most original contribution to 
continental philosophy, he remains far more famous for his voluminous contributions to 
radical left wing thought.6 It is therefore important to introduce the philosophical 
grounding for his positions to as more general audience. Secondly, Badiou’s 
metaphysical tomes are famously dense and often difficult to summarize. Part of this is 
due to his use of complex mathematics and mathematical terms, and part of it is due to 
his occasionally unclear writing style.  Grounding Badiou’s metaphysics in an analysis 
of his politics help us better see what the point of the former is, while demonstrating 
the systematic nature of his philosophical architecture more fully. 
I will be offering a critical analysis of both dimensions of his thought, though 
primarily focusing on the latter.  Firstly, I will address the metaphysical core of his 
philosophy.  Badiou is committed to combatting historicism in philosophy, which he 
feels is both wrong in itself and conducive to unfortunate cultural tendencies.7  His 
metaphysics can be understood as a call for continental philosophers to return to the 
Platonic roots of the discipline.  Badiou wishes us to re-enact Plato’s gesture of asserting 
the eternal truths of mathematics against the Sophists.8  His entire metaphysical 
architecture is intended to prove that truth is possible in philosophy, and that we need 
not cede so much ground to the nihilistic anti-philosophers who claim truth is, at best, 
only a matter of language and power. 
                                                          
4 Consider Zizek’s now famous comments that Badiou is a modern “Hegel.”   
5 Consider the impact of Badiou’s work on his former student Quentin Meillasoux, who has published an 
influential book of his own. See Quentin Meillasoux. After Finitude: An Essay on the Contingency of Necessity. 
(London, UK. Bloomsbury Academic, 2010), which starts with a euphoric Preface by Badiou. 
6 As evidenced, for example, by the comparative popularity of his books on Sarkozy and history relative to 
Being and Event and his other dense metaphysical works. 
7 This comes most to the fore in his critiques of “democratic materialism.” See Alain Badiou. Logics of 
Worlds: Being and Event II, trans. Alberto Toscano. (London, UK. Continuum, 2009), 1 
8 See Alain Badiou. Conditions, trans. Steven Corcoran. (London: Continuum, 2008) 
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I find this to be quite inspiring. Unfortunately, I do not believe that Badiou 
ultimately succeeds in his goal.  This is because Badiou does not offering sufficiently 
compelling meta-mathematical and epistemological reasons for why his system should 
be accepted over other, equally Platonic, alternatives.  Badiou wants to have it both 
ways: he develops a Platonic philosophy, which is justified because the consequences of 
sophistic anti-philosophy have been blatantly unfortunate.  But while this might be a 
prompt to abandon sophism, it is a great leap to go from this inclination to accepting 
the often asserted rather than argued for metaphysical architecture that he proposes.  
This problem is also true in Badiou’s politics.  He is sharply critical of liberal 
democrats and conservatives, holding to the Communist hypothesis that we shall only 
be truly liberated from our “masters” when we show greater fidelity to the 
revolutionary Events to come.  During these time periods, it will be possible to 
militantly commit to the truth of a new future.  With this, we shall see a more authentic 
politics begin where individuals are no longer beholden to the vulgarizing tendencies of 
capital, and its modern ideology of democratic materialism.  While there is again much 
to admire here, it does not strike us as particularly helpful for advancing any 
constructive left wing causes. Once one separates Badiou’s political claims from its 
impressive but faulty metaphysical architecture, he comes across as a sharp critic of the 
contemporary era and the Left’s now increasingly anachronistic alignment with identity 
politics.  But in terms of what is to be done, we are left with little except promises of a 
messianic event to come where the forces of progress will inevitably have their day.  
This strikes me as altogether too prone to mysticism; indeed, it smacks of a type of 
Orthodox Marxism that was rightly criticized by many of the post-modern thinkers 
Badiou wants to reject.  In the final substantive section, I offer a collection of reasons 
why Badiou’s philosophy and politics requires substantive clarification if it is to be 
considered both comprehensive and intellectually coherent.  Badiou or Badioueans 
should be more attentive to details of the sort I raise, and less enamoured with the 
prospects of grand theorizing. 
BADIOU’S CRITICISMS OF POLITICAL THEORY AND POST-MODERN 
ANTI-PHILOSOPHY 
Badiou’s politics draw heavily on the metaphysical framework established in his more 
directly philosophical works, which we discussed extensively above.  He understands 
politics to be one of the “conditions” which constitute human subjectivity, alongside 
love, art, and philosophy itself. To summarize quickly: for Badiou, politics occurs when 
we are confronted with a historical event, such as the French or Russian revolution, 
from which a new truth of social ordering emerges from the infinite multiplicity of 
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Being.9  As subject, human beings then have the equal chance of choosing fidelity to 
this new truth or rejecting it.  Obviously, Badiou prefers that we embrace the former 
and its radical potential for transformation. As he nicely puts it in Conditions:  
 “…politics amounts to an immanent site of though that disposes its 
nominations, its sites and its statements in accordance with the law of a specific 
fidelity to an event.”10   
Given the complexity and interconnectedness of his work, unpacking what Badiou 
means by politics can be a formidable task.  To help explicate by contrast, this section 
will highlight what Badiou’s is not trying to achieve with his politics.  The hope is that 
this will better indicate what makes his position unique, both because of its systematic 
connection to his metaphysics, and due to its own novelty as a philosophical account of 
(meta) politics.  
Firstly, Badiou is deeply opposed to developing an explicit political theory of the 
type popular in the analytical tradition.  He is deeply critical of philosophers who 
assume the stance of a “brutal and confused objectivity” when developing “ethical 
demands”11 that are to be imposed on the world.12   
                                                          
9 See Alain Badiou. Conditions,  
10 Badiou, Conditions, 163 
11 As we shall discuss later, this position strikes us as deeply confused. Much of it stems from Badiou’s 
general phobia towards transcendental arguments of any type, including political theories that rely on 
constructive claims which emerge from simplifying heuristic devices.  Unfortunately Badiou rarely 
provides any specific examples, though it is not difficult to surmise who he might be thinking of. Such 
theories are very common in analytical political theory. The most notable of would be John Rawls’ theory 
of justice, though one could also cite Habermas’ arguments for a dialogical ethics predicated on 
formulating the conditions for ideal speech situations, or Dworkin’s arguments for the integrity of law as 
perceived by a superhuman Judge.  See John Rawls. A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition. (Cambridge, MA. 
Harvard University Press, 1999), 221-227 and Jurgen Habermas. The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political 
Theory, ed. Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff. (Cambridge, MA. The MIT Press, 2000) and Ronald 
Dworkin. “Hard Cases” in Taking Rights Seriously. (Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press, 1977). 
However, Badiou never offers many specific arguments on why such reasoning is invalid. Much of it 
simply strikes us as undue prejudice against the analytical tradition borne out of a simplistic reading of 
what its political philosophers are trying to accomplish. Badiou simply seems to regard any transcendental 
theorizing, as is commonly deployed in the analytical tradition, as deficient because it is not derived from 
some deeper ontological truth.  But he completely ignores that most analytical political philosophers are 
not ignorant of ontological problems.  Indeed, many of them deliberately want to segregate political 
theory from more general philosophical questions to give it a greater analytical heft and to avoid 
controversies that aren’t germane to the main orientation of the project. Perhaps this is inadvisable and 
political theorists would do better if they paid more attention to ontology.  As we shall see below, he has 
reasons for adopting this position. But Badiou cannot simply declare that any other approach to political 
philosophy is wrongheaded and move on, especially when many of these figures have compelling reasons 
to adopt a contrary stance.  Ontological fiat does not evade the problems of philosophical disagreement, 
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There are two reasons for this unusual stance.  The first is that the practice of 
political theorizing runs against Badiou’s ontological commitments.  Badiou believes 
that traditional political theorists operate on the presumption that it must be possible to 
determine once and for all the truths that should order all social life.  Plato is the 
classical example.  But Badiou rejects this totalizing logic at the ontological level.  As 
there is no singular point where multiplicity merges into oneness, there are no final 
truths about how the social world should be ordered.  There are historical events 
which establish their own truths, and subjects who can choose to show fidelity to them 
or not.   
The second reason Badiou rejects constructing a political theory is more explicitly 
related to his politics.  He is committed to a radical project of egalitarian communism, 
where the state will gradually become untethered and the people will be emancipated 
from the shackles of their “masters” and the subservient intellectual cronies who 
vindicate their rule.  Badiou does not think it is possible to stay committed to this 
project while developing a set of principles which are to order emancipated and equal 
subjects.  To do so would be to arrogantly assume a privileged position denied to most 
people.13  As he puts it in Metapolitics: 
“The trouble with most doctrines of justice is their will to define what is, followed 
by attempts to realize it.  But justice, which is the philosophical name for the 
egalitarian maxim, cannot be defined.  For equality is not an objective of action, 
it is an axiom.  There is no politics bound to truth without the affirmation-an 
affirmation that can neither be confirmed nor guaranteed-of a universal capacity 
for political truth.”14 
Some of this rhetoric suggests that Badiou is a close to being a post-modern critic; 
someone who offers critiques of the contemporary social order but rejects the 
intellectual task of conceiving alternatives.  And indeed, his work develops many 
trenchant criticisms of capitalism, the state, and the ideologies of the powerful.  But 
Badiou rejects the post-modern position that the job of the philosopher is only to 
engage in these critical tasks.  Indeed, he does not believe that post-modern critics can 
even be called philosophers in the strong sense.  They are instead anti-philosophers 
                                                                                                                                                         
on this or any other issue.  In the future, we may take up this problem more directly since it is important 
and connotes two distinctly different views on politics and philosophy. However, to deal with it in more 
depth here would be distracting.   
12 See Alain Badiou. Metapolitics, trans. Jason Barker. (London: Verso, 2005), 11. 
13 As we shall see later, he is not entirely faithful to this.  At other points he can sometimes come across as 
quite dismissive of the idea that all individuals opinions should be considered, but for unique reasons. 
14 See Badiou, Metapolitics, 99. 
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who believe that all reality is constituted by power relations, or “bodies and languages” 
fashioned by the world as he sometimes puts it.15  The political payoff of their project 
is what Badiou derisively terms “democratic materialism” which is oriented around the 
presumption that, since all truth claims are equally groundless, it is best to consider 
every viewpoint whatever their substantive content.  As he puts it in Logics of  Worlds: 
 “In order to validate the equation ‘existence=individual=body’ contemporary 
doxa must valiantly reduce humanity to an overstretched version of 
animality…Moreover, it is essentially a democratic materialism.  That is because 
the contemporary consensus, in recognizing the plurality of languages, 
presupposes their juridical equality.  Hence, the assimilation of humanity to 
animality culminates in the identification of the human animal with the diversity 
of its sub-species and the democratic rights that inhere in this 
diversity…Communities and cultures, colours and pigments, religions and 
clergies, uses and customs, disparate sexualities, public intimacies and the 
publicity of the intimate: everything and everyone deserves to be recognized and 
protected by the law.”16 
Here, Badiou seems to tightly conflate the emergence of the post-modern mindset with 
our contemporary commitment to human rights projects and the liberal legalism that 
seems to imply.  
This may strike many people as an unusual gesture, given the propensity of 
postmodern critics to be at the very least skeptical of human rights.  But it is important 
to understand that Badiou’s reasoning here is quite precise.  He sees both liberalism 
and post-modernism as branches of the same anti-philosophical tree-dedicated to 
protecting the rights of individuals to express their identities and viewpoints with as 
little intrusion as possible. This quite radical conclusion suggests that, in this respect at 
least, liberalism and post-modernism are alike at their core. Both traditions reject the 
idea that there could be ontological truths which transcends our individual bodies and 
languages and to which we should demonstrate some fidelity.  And indeed, he would 
seem to be standing on some solid ground here.  Modern liberal philosophy since a 
least Kant’s (anti) Copernican revolution17 has been skeptical that we can achieve an 
understanding of some transcendent truths.  Since we are always bound by the 
limitations of our mind, we can never have unfiltered access to truth and goodness as 
                                                          
15 See Badiou. Logics of Worlds 
16 See Badiou. Logics of Worlds, 2 
17 This point about the anti-Copernican nature of Kant’s revolution is emphasized by Badiou’s student 
Meillasoux.  Meillasoux highlights that, where Copernicus sought to invert anthropocentric cosmologies, 
Kant made the entirety of knowledge dependent on what can be experienced by human beings. See 
Meillasoux. After Finitude. 
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these things are “in themselves.”  This skepticism about truth is why many liberal 
philosophers have tried to argue that we must respect the views of as many individuals 
as possible, since we can never be sure that our positions about what is true and good 
are beyond criticism. Indeed, some philosophers such as Rawls have gone so far as to 
call for a purely “political liberalism” detached from even the most basic metaphysical 
presumptions about truth and goodness “in themselves.”18 In this respect, liberalism 
seems to have many connections to post-modernism’s anti-philosophical critiques of 
foundationalism. While post-modern thinkers may speak more radically than modern 
liberals, according to Badiou both adopt more or less the same conclusions about truth 
and its relationship to politics. 
BADIOU’S POLITICS OF THE EVENT 
This brings my back to what makes Badiou’s politics unique in a more positive sense.  
While he does not want to develop a political theory which once and for all will 
determine what truths should be adopted in politics, he is also unwilling to accept the 
liberal and post-modern position that there can be no truths in politics, only bodies 
and languages. Badiou is able and willing to defend an argument that there are 
“truths” and that they should play a role in framing our political subjectivity.  Indeed, 
he argues that truths, as they manifest on the sites of true historical events, are 
important to demonstrate the lies propagated by our “masters” in the state and 
amongst the capitalist class.19 When truths manifest in historical events, they 
demonstrate the void in the existence of what has come before and open a new horizon 
for genuine politics. 
This is where Badiou’s arguments for the “communist hypothesis” come in, so it 
bears examining in more depth. Badiou has been criticized quite vehemently for his 
positive comments about Maoism, and for his more general sympathies towards to 
Marxist project. And indeed, there are certain anachronistic features of his work that 
we will highlight later.  But it is important to understand where Badiou is coming from 
with his apparently unusual arguments.  To Badiou, communism emerges as the truth 
of society when the powers that be can no longer totalize the movements of history 
within a univocal ideological framework.  Put in his language more specifically, the 
Event reveals the partial groundlessness of a totalizing univocity through the 
appearance of a new truth which emerges from the multiplicity of being.  Prior to the 
                                                          
18 See John Rawls. Political Liberalism: With a New Introduction and the ‘Reply to Habermas.’ (New York, NY. 
Columbia University Press, 1993) 
19 See Alain Badiou. The Rebirth of History: Times of Riots and Uprisings, trans. Gregory Elliott. (London, UK. 
Verso, 2012) 
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Event, the masters of the world ordered it according to this ideology to ensure that they 
remained atop the social hierarchy, and dismiss any attempts to remove them as 
fantasy.  But the Event displays the lie of their attempt to totalize history within a 
singular truth wherein they will always be on top, and shatters the power dynamics of 
the calcified order.  This is one respect in which Badiou’s hypothesis is “communist.” 
But there is another, and more positive sense of this as well.  Not only does the Event 
demonstrate the incompleteness of the old social order, it grants individuals a unique 
opportunity to fashion themselves in a new way by seizing power and constructing a 
new society that will not be defined by the hierarchies of the old.  In these contexts, all 
individuals who have been nothing have the chance to become all. Through the Event, 
all become equal again.20 
This also brings us to why Badiou characterizes his position alternately as “ethical” 
and “metapolitical.”  As mentioned earlier, Badiou does not want to provide a 
programme of theory for politics any more than he wants to concede all ground to the 
skeptic.  Instead, he wants to link communism to the operations of being itself in all of 
its multiplicity.  This very closely follows Althusser in giving an orthodox reading of 
Marxism; one that truly believes that the Event of revolution comes about due to the 
movements of material reality rather than the considered choices of revolutionary 
actors.21 But Badiou does break from Althusser in granting individuals some agency 
beyond their historical role within a false totality.22  When the Event occurs, 
individuals have the option of showing fidelity to ontologically emergent truths or 
rejecting them.  Interestingly enough, Badiou sees this as an ethical act, but one with 
unique connotations for our identity.  In many respects he follows existential thinkers in 
                                                          
20 In some respect, Badiou’s arguments here resembles Rousseau’s idealization of the state of nature as a 
time before social hierarchies where all were equal.  One way to understand Badiou might be as a figure 
who attempts to transplant these arguments into concrete historical imperatives: during the vent, we are 
returned to the state of nature.  Badiou seems to make some arguments to this effect when he claims that 
Rousseau “proves” that the general will cannot ever be represented, even by the sovereign state. As such, 
the state will always be subject to contestation because it will always be prone to hierarchical orderings. 
However, he does not draw a link to  Rousseau’s comments about the state of nature, even though much 
of it resembles Badiou’s own, quasi-religious, interpretation of the event.  See Badiou, Being and Event, 347. 
For more on the religious aspects of Badiou’s thought, see the section below. 
21 See Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar. Reading Capital. (London, UK. Verso Press, 2009) 
22 Here Badiou’s arguments can be helpfully compared to Althusser’s much less individualistic reading of 
history.  This is latent in all of his work, but probably is most clearly expressed via his criticisms of 
Sartrean humanism.  See Louis Althusser. “Reply to John Lewis (Self Criticism)” in On Ideology. (London, 
UK. Verso Press, 2008), 65-114.  Throughout his criticism of Lewis’ Sartrean Marxism, Althusser is 
stridently insistent that Marx has little place for individual subjectivity and the humanism it seems to beget 
so naturally. 
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seeing the decision to show fidelity23 to the truth of the Event as constitutive of our 
human subjectivity.  In the moment of the Event, the subject is called upon to “give 
everything he is-his body, his abilities” to “enable the passing of a truth along its path.”  
The subject must then invent a new way of being and acting in the situation.24  
But, as mentioned, Badiou goes beyond existentialism in maintaining that, since 
the Event brings a new truth into the world that is not beholden to the dynamical laws 
that may have governed previous truths, the compulsion to invent new ways of being 
always has a radically egalitarian dimension.  The Event reveals the laws of the old 
hierarchy, and clears a space for a new and more equal social ordering. Unfortunately, 
how this is to be carried out and what it would look like is not spelled out in any 
significant detail beyond the vague and rightly disturbing appeals to Maoism.  But if 
one has followed Badiou so far, one would realize that providing such details would be 
besides the point at best, and counterproductive at worst.  The Event stands for its own 
truth, not that which any given subject with an anterior motive wishes to ascribe to it.   
These two sections have attempted to describe Badiou’s politics and draw some 
links to his metaphysics.  I believe Badiou can be understood as evading both the 
temptations of analytical political theory and post-modern skepticism through his 
metaphysics.  According to Badiou, the multiplicity of Being guarantees that the old 
social totality will break down, and a new one will emerge through subjects who show 
fidelity to the truth of this radical Event.  In this way, he seeks to capture what is best in 
the classical Marxist (materialist) project as read through Althusser and others, while 
still leaving more room for subjectivity than orthodox Marxism would allow. This is a 
fine line to walk, and to his credit, Badiou often does so successfully.  In many ways, his 
work resembles and in some places consciously emulates the equally dialectical work of 
Hegel.  But in other respects, it remains somewhat deficient (including, appropriately 
enough, in its treatment of Hegelian type problems).  In the final section, I will 
highlight some of the problems with Badiou’s political thought, in particular his 
treatment of subjectivity and its related approach to history.  These flow organically 
from some of the deficiencies in his metaphysics that we also highlighted earlier in this 
paper.   
                                                          
23 At times he uses the more overtly Kierkegaardian term of “faith” when describing our commitment to 
the truth of the event. See Soren Kierkegaard. Fear and Trembling, trans. Alastair Hannay. (London, UK. 
Penguin Books, 1986) 
24 See Alain Badiou. Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, trans. Peter Hallward. (London, UK. Verso 
Press, 2012), 41-42 
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CRITICISM OF BADIOU’S ONTOLOGY 
I will begin this section with a brief comment about a fairly minor problem, before 
moving on to the deeper issues underpinning Badiou’s politics.  This minor problem 
relates to the intersection between ethics and politics in his work.  The problem is that 
the latter often subsumes the former.  Badiou’s ethics has an inherently political cast to 
it; there is very little in his work that pertains to proper action in the realm of everyday 
life.  His focus is almost always on broad institutional questions concerning how the 
social form should be reorganized to engender a more equal and free society.  There is 
nothing wrong with this per se, but it is unusual to imply25 that it exhausts the content 
of ethics.  For instance, even in a political society of the type envisioned by Badiou 
there would still be major ethical problems that cannot be easily resolved.  Would it be 
right for individuals to have two kidneys when they could easily donate one in order to 
save a life? Should we abandon supporting philosophy and art if it can be positively 
demonstrated that there are more consequentially useful activities which benefit all?26 
Should individuals be required to abandon bad habits that form part of the tapestry of 
our identity and inculcate virtues that are socially useful, and indeed conducive to an 
egalitarian society?  
The reason these more individualized ethical questions pertain to his politics is that 
they point to a fundamentally Kantian problem27 about the relationship between 
ethical acts and freedom.  Cast in that language, one might call it a tension between 
freedom and duty, which pertains both at the day to day level and at the level of a 
politics of fidelity. Badiou often seems to imply that the relationship between the two is 
that the Event constitutes its own imperatives, and that individuals are then free to 
accept or reject them as per their wish.  But the tension does not just exist in Evental 
moments where we are called upon to make drastic decisions. Often there are more 
day to day issues which arise where we might feel compelled to put aside our individual 
orientation to act in a manner that seems more ethically robust.  These choices may 
not be ones we’d wish to make, and may not even be reflective of one’s individuality.  
Focusing exclusively on ethics as mostly a politics of fidelity to the Event may seem 
grander, but it ignores these more challenging tensions that we must deal with.  But 
they may none the less be ethical. How a society would deal with these tensions is an 
                                                          
25 I do not believe that Badiou ever makes the claim that his account entirely exhausts the content of 
ethics implied by his position, but he often writes as if it does.   
26 These are observation made by Peter Singer. See Peter Singer. The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective 
Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. (New Haven, CN. Yale University Press, 2015) 
27 Here I follow Wood. See Allen W, Wood. Kant’s Ethical Thought. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999) 
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important question that is largely unanswered in Badiou’s work.  It focuses too much 
on the conditions for what appears to be a more politically and ethically robust society 
without providing adequate details. 
Badiou’s focus on fidelity and the Event is not just a problem at this level.  It reflects 
a deeper mystery that lies at the heart of his work.  The most basic problem with 
Badiou’s politics is deeply related to his ontology: its treatment of history.  Generally 
speaking Badiou has been quite critical of Hegelian/Marxist type historicism, and the 
belief that it is possible to develop some formula for the “science of history.” Instead, he 
calls history a “reservoir of proper names.”  History is a “symbolic fiction” which is 
represented to most people via the unifying force of a proper name.28   Against this, the 
truth of an idea, for instance the idea of communism, must be advocated to push the 
individual against the constraints imposed by the powers that be.  On this point his 
particular Communist sympathies deviate quite substantially from Althusser’s, except 
in keeping its most unscientific dimensions. Indeed, much of his account of history 
echoes the most unusual features of Marxist messiahanism, but given a distinctive twist. 
From this, it should be clear how and why Badiou believes that traditional Marxist 
accounts of history are problematic.   In particular, he singles these accounts out for 
relying on a totalizing Hegelian logic, according to which the singular “meaning” of 
history appears in due course.29  As indicated in the section above, he wishes to replace 
this Hegelianism with his own ontological framework where Being is not the movement 
of an immanent dialectic oriented towards a singular end.  While his account of history 
is dialectical, it is distinct from the Marxist model in being open ended and 
ontologically incomplete.  As we have seen, rather than move towards a singular end, 
the truth or untruth of a social system manifest through and Event that demands 
fidelity at the site of its appearance. The Event occurs because the multiplicity of Being 
manifests itself inevitably; no master or ideologically can close off its possibility, even if 
they apply overwhelming power to prevent it.  In these situations the truth becomes 
subjectivized in the form of an Idea, in particular the idea of emancipation through the 
establishment of a new egalitarian order and the destruction of the old hierarchy. 
The Event has a quasi-religious significance for Badiou, a point echoed by the 
language of fidelity and faith he deploys to describe both our subjective orientation 
towards them and the site of their manifestation. While God will never intervene to 
devastate those who blaspheme against his word, the truth of the Event will overcome 
                                                          
28 See Alain Badiou. The Communist Hypothesis, trans. David Macey and Steve Corcoran. (London, UK. 
Verso Press, 2009), 189. 
29 This point echoes why he felt the need to replace Hegel’s logic with his own.  See Badiou, Logics of 
Worlds 
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the hypocrisy of a given hierarchy and sweep away the modern Pharisee’s who support 
it.  To provide just one example, consider the rhetoric in Badiou’s description of the 
Worker’s Commune of 1871, which he takes as a paradigmatic Event: 
 “…If the inexistent aspect of a site must ultimately capture, in the order of 
appearing, a maximal intensity, it is only to the extent that this intensity 
henceforth takes the place of what has disappeared; its maximality is the 
subsisting mark, in the world, of the event itself. The ‘eternal’ existence of an 
inexistent consists in the trace of statement, in the world, of the evanescent event. 
The proclamations of the Commune, the first worker power in universal history, 
comprise a historic existent whose absoluteness manifests the coming to pass in 
the world of a wholly new ordering of its appearing, a mutation of its logic. The 
existence of an inexistent aspect is that by which, in the domain of appearing, the 
subversion of worldly appearing by subjacent being is played out. It is the logical 
marking of a paradox of being, an ontological chimera.”30 
This paragraph is saturated with quasi-Hegelian rhetoric, and often seems to 
delight in its embrace of paradox and contradiction. This strikes me as rather bizarre. 
It is one thing to bite occasional paradoxical bullet, but in his account of history Badiou 
often seems open to consuming an oncoming arsenal.  Indeed, this paragraph alone 
begs for Marxist satire of the type so ably deployed in the master’s Critique of  Hegel’s 
Philosophy of  Right.31  Badiou’s love of mystification and grandiosity is a bit of a 
weakness when he moves from the inevitably high minded realm of ontology into 
discussing the harder edged realities of real history. It obfuscates from what we take to 
be the more crucial issues at hand.   
While Badiou’s interpretation of history does have the virtue of avoiding pseudo-
Hegelian monologism, he does not avoid the most crucial problem of ontological 
totalization.  This is a key problem. Badiou believes that human history operates 
according to the logic of fundamental ontology, with the multiplicity of Being resulting 
in the destabilization of all human hierarchies etc.  This may be the case, but Badiou 
never establishes why or how this is so in a theoretically robust way.  When one 
carefully examines his extensive oeuvre, one sees that his arguments about history are 
mainly assertions whose tenability flows from accepting the underpinning framework.  
Put another way, Badiou simply assumes that human history operates according to the 
same laws of fundamental ontology; albeit with some conversions and adaptations to 
account for the existence of human subjects and to lead to conclusions about the 
                                                          
30 See Badiou, The Communist Hypothesis, 167-168. 
31 See Karl Marx. “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.” In Early Writings, trans. (London, UK. 
Penguin Books, 1992) 
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stability of political regimes that are consonant with his own sympathies.  This is a 
highly suspicious gesture, and not at all adequate to support the radical conclusions 
Badiou proposes as self-evident.  Seen in this light, Badiou’s theory of history and 
politics seems more like an extension of its author’s preferences rather than a deeply 
considered framework which can be useful to those looking to realize social change.   
To demonstrate by contrast, consider Marx’s own account of what, following 
Althusser, we might call the philosophy of “dialectical materialism” and its related 
“science of history.”32 It too can be accused of mysticism and obfuscation, particularly 
with regard to its more prescriptive dimensions.  Marx’s comments about what should 
replace liberal capitalism never went very far beyond his early and likely sarcastic 
remarks with Engel’s in otherwise seminal works such as The German Ideology. 
 “For as soon as the distribution of labour comes into being, each man has a 
particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which 
he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a critical critic, and 
must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; while in 
communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each 
can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general 
production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another 
tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the 
evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming 
hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic. This fixation of social activity, this 
consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective power above us, 
growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our 
calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up till now.”33 
This lack of a clear template, even what Badiou would derisively call a “political 
theory” has often been held up as a virtue by thinkers such as Althusser who wish to 
stress the philosophical and scientific objectivity of “dialectical materialism” and the 
“science of history” respectively.  This suggests that the immanent collapse of the 
liberal-capitalist order is inevitable, thus negating the requirement to in fact develop a 
substantial normative argument for why subjects who are capable of remaking history 
should choose to develop a new and better alternative to the status quo.  It also means 
neglecting what Judith Butler might call the “psychic” life of power;34 not just that 
                                                          
32 Althusser, Louis and Balibar, Etienne. Reading Capital. (London, UK. Verso Press, 2009) 
33 See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The German Ideology: Includes Theses on Feuerbach and the Introduction to 
the Critique of Political Economy. (Amherst. NY: Prometheus Books, 1998), 53 
34 See Judith Butler. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection. (Stanford, CA. Stanford University Press, 
1997) 
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consciousness plays a role in replicating materialist domination, but that consciousness 
itself plays a constitutive role in engendering the very existence of institutions and 
apparatuses of material oppression and ideological promulgation.  Such criticisms have 
long been understood and accepted even by many Marxist thinkers such as David 
Harvey and Slavoj Zizek, who have pointed out the considerable problems with Marx’s 
own mechanistic account of an inevitable communist future to come. As Zizek points 
out, invoking Lacanian criticisms of such a mechanistic materialism: 
“For traditional Marxists, materialism means that ideology….is grounded in the 
extra-ideological material process of social (re)production (“being determined 
consciousness”); what they ignore is the proper material existence if ideology in 
the [ideological state apparatuses], in a complex institutional network of practices 
and rituals.  However, Lacan here goes on step further than Althusser: there is a 
specific materiality of ideas themselves, immanent to the “ideal” symbolic order, 
insofar as this order cannot be reduced to (an expression or) meaning but 
functions as a “meaningless” machine, the machine that is the big Other beyond 
any concrete materialization in institutions and material practices.” 35 
These problems indicate not just the limitations of the specifically materialist 
philosophical outlook unique to Marxism, but why it remains important to delve into 
the murkier realm of “political theory” whether one wishes to or not.  This is why 
projects like Cohen’s remain a useful addendum to Marx’s; since they develop a 
convincing and thorough argument not just that liberal capitalism may well end, but 
give us some useful clues about the more egalitarian society which may replace it.36  
But, with these exceptions and qualifications, few would accuse Marx of being 
unduly prone to simply asserting the truth of his theory of history from a certain 
ontological presumptions.  Indeed, as Althusser himself points out, the key transition in 
Marx’s thought is from his more speculative “young” phase to the more mature 
“scientific” phase of his adulthood.37 In this era, far from relying on the self-evident 
nature of dialectical materialism, Marx grounded his analysis in substantial empirical 
facts and an abundance of helpful analogies with the most relevant science of his day.38 
He was clearly keen to show how dialectical materialism wasn’t just a philosophical 
ground; it was a framework for analysis that could be assessed against other salient 
                                                          
35 See Slavoj Zizek. Absolute Recoil: Towards a New Foundation of Dialectical Materialism. (London, UK: Verso 
Books, 2014), 55 
36 See G.A Cohen. Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence. (Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press, 2001) 
37 See Louis Althusser. For Marx, trans, Ben Brewster. (London, UK. Verso Press, 2006) 
38 See Karl Marx. Capital: Volume I, trans. Ben Fowkes. (London, UK. Penguin Press, 1990).  Our more 
technical reading of the Marxist tradition is inspired by Fine and Saad-Filho.  See Ben Fine and Alfredo 
Saad-Filho. Marx’s Capital: Fifth Edition. (London, UK. Pluto Press, 2006) 
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facts and issues.39  
 This is part of the features that gives the Marxist approach its longevity and power, 
not to mention is appeal to thinkers as different as G.A Cohen and Slavoj Zizek.40  As 
David Harvey has consistently noted, Marx’s dialectical materialism was in no sense a 
dogmatic epistemological standpoint predicated on a strict ontology.  Materialist 
dialectics, both at an epistemological and an ontological level, is fundamentally 
relational. It posits that our perception of independently existent objects and subjects 
emerge as part of a deeper ontological process which we must come to grasp more 
reflectively. It is this process that is the deepest level of reality, and because it is 
continuously in flux we must always remain cognizant of how the objects and subjects 
which appear at the level of perception possess a largely contingent existence.  In this 
respect Marxist dialectics has a great deal in common with the process oriented 
philosophies of figures like Whitehead.41  But, and this is key, understood properly 
Marxism is capable of explaining them in a manner that eschews mystical appeals to 
some metaphysical vitalistic force, theology, or ideational concepts such as the 
Absolute. 
By contrast, Badiou does not even feel it is necessary to describe how his 
mathematical ontology links up with the claims of contemporary physics.42  This is a 
problem when analyzed just at the metaphysical level; when applied to a subject matter 
even more remote like human history it becomes a tremendous gap.  And this this gap 
is not just a theoretical problem which can be hashed out in the future, especially for a 
thinker like Badiou.  The analytical political theorists and the democratic materialists 
whom he criticizes could get away with a project where the link between their 
metaphysics and their political commitments were tenuous. This is because no part of 
their project is intended to rely so heavily on the others; Rawls’ project can be saved 
from its Kantian underpinnings, much like a great deal of Derrida’s work on language 
can be sustained even if one rejects his work on ethics.  However Badiou wants to have 
                                                          
39 On this methodological point, see Karl Marx. Grundrisse: Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, 
trans. Martin Nicolaus. (Middlesex, UK. Pelican Books, 1973), 100-108. 
40 See G.A Cohen. Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence. (Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press, 2001) 
and Slavoj Zizek. Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism. (London, UK. Verso, 
Press. 2012) 
41 My reading of the process oriented dimensions of Marxism is largely inspired by Harvey.  See David 
Harvey. Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference. (Maiden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1996) 
42Take his account of an object, as a collection of multiple elements indexed under a name.  All the 
atomic elements of appearing referred to by this multiple are real in their manifestation in the world as 
objects.  See Badiou, Logics of Worlds, 220-221.  It is astounding that nowhere does he discuss the problems 
with this model posed by quantum mechanics, for example the issue of non-localizability.   
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it every way; to give an ontological account of reality that links seamlessly to a negative 
account of history which in turn births certain political commitments.  Such huge 
ambitions would require that clear links be established every step of the way.  For 
instance, it is not clear on his account why the operations of human history should 
seamlessly follow the same logic as Being qua Being.  As has well been noted, human 
societies and histories operate according to patterns which cannot necessarily be 
explained by appeal to some deeper set of ontological laws.  Indeed, the same is true 
even in the workings of biological entities.  Badiou attempts to account for this through 
his transcendental logic and account of subjectivity.  But this is never entirely 
convincing since the ontology is always determinative in the last instance.  This raises 
an epistemic question and an ontological question.  Firstly, why should we take the laws 
of fundamental ontology to explain what goes on at different levels of reality?  Isn’t it 
possible that different epistemic frameworks might be required?43  
And secondly, it is not clear why fundamental ontology should exhaust all 
ontological inquiries. Here, Badiou’s Platonism seems excessively foundationalist and 
even deterministic. He believes that the ontological basis of reality is mathematical, 
and that this basis is determinative of reality up to the Event, where the subject is 
constituted and some form of agency becomes possible. However, even if he is correct 
that mathematics is at the fundamental root of any acceptable ontology, this needn’t be 
interpreted in such a strong foundationalist manner.   Indeed, is it possible that 
Badiou’s monological interest in Being qua Being might distract from an even more 
radical possibility; that time itself changes the operation of ontological laws, and that 
history in the broadest (physical) sense is therefore more decisive than fundamental 
ontology?44 This is the argument of figures like Roberto Unger and Lee Smolin, who 
have a more nuanced approach to mathematics and ontology than that found in 
Badiou. Their work also demonstrates the strengths of appealing to physics and 
developments in the sciences when trying to develop a thorough account of reality that 
                                                          
43 Badiou has long disdained epistemological issues, often to his detriment. For instance, it has led to an 
almost total lack of engagement with analytical thinkers involved in the same issues he is concerned with.  
To give just one example, Saul Kripke has long dealt with many of the same issues of contingency and 
necessity as Badiou, but also takes epistemology as seriously as metaphysics.  See Saul Kripke. Naming and 
Necessity. (Malden, MA. Blackwell Publishing, 1981).  For Badiou’s dismissive comments on epistemological 
issues see Alain Badiou with Gilles Haeri.  In Praise of Mathematics, trans. Susan Spitzer. (Cambridge, UK. 
Polity Press, 2016), 13-14. 
44 This fascinating possibility has been raised recently by Roberto Unger and Lee Smolin. Interestingly, 
there are considerable parallels between at least Unger and Smolin. Both are left wing thinkers of great 
ambition who frequently delve into more basic philosophical problems.  See Roberto Mangabeira Unger 
and Lee Smolin. The Singular Universe and the Reality of Time. (Cambridge, UK. Cambridge University Press, 
2015) 
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links mathematics, materialism, and politics together. In their book The Singular Universe 
and the Reality of  Time Unger and Smolin argue persuasively that new discoveries about 
the nature of quantum theory suggest that even the laws of mathematics, while 
necessary to understanding nature, may themselves be contingent and develop through 
time.45 Their position echoes the opinions of earlier thinkers like Deleuze and Bergson, 
who also emphasized the importance of time and change when understanding 
ontology and mathematics. It also meshes more consistently with process oriented 
ontologies, such as Marx’s discussed above.   As Unger put it in his companion paper 
“A Mystery Demystified”: 
“The distinctiveness of the mathematical perspective -- its evisceration of 
particularity and its suppression of time -- helps explain the power of mathematics 
to illuminate a universe in which time holds sway and particularity is everywhere. 
This power, nevertheless, perpetually subjects us to a twofold risk. The first risk is 
to mistake the mathematical representation of a slice of the one real world -- the 
slice that has to do with bundles of relations and with structured wholes -- for 
privileged, indubitable insight into a separate, nature-transcending realm of 
mathematical truths. There is no such realm, any more than there is a multitude 
of unobservable universes (now commonly called the multiverse) whose existence 
we postulate only because they fill the otherwise empty boxes of a mathematical 
conception, disguised as a physical theory. The second risk is that we allow 
ourselves to be lulled by the effectiveness and beauty of our mathematical 
propositions into the belief that nature shares in their timelessness. It would do so, 
most convincingly, by operating under the force of eternal laws and symmetries. 
Such regularities achieve adequate expression only when they can be represented 
mathematically. Their susceptibility to mathematical representation confirms, 
according to this illusion, their claim to participate in the freedom of mathematics 
from time. It does not. To believe that it does is to spoil the gift of mathematics to 
physics.”46 
CONSEQUENCES FOR BADIOU’S POLITICS   
I raise these deeper ontological questions not to suggest that they knock down Badiou’s 
politics decisively. Again, I am largely sympathetic to much of his project. But with 
regard to his politics, the more useful aspects of his thought strike me as his critical 
comments on both political philosophy and the skepticism of democratic materialism.  
                                                          
45 See Roberto Mangabeira Unger and Lee Smolin. The Singular Universe and the Reality of Time. 
(Cambridge, UK. Cambridge University Press, 2015) 
46 See Roberto Mangabeira Unger. “A Mystery Demystified: The Connection Between Mathematics and 
Physics” http://robertounger.com/, /pdfs/MATHEMATICS_AND_PHYSICS1.pdf, at 1 
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His own positive contributions seem highly speculative, and don’t really follow from 
one another. At best they are highly conjectural, at worse they seem to fall back into 
the kind of mysticism that Marx’s, and for that matter Unger and Smolin’s, more 
process oriented ontologies were supposed to rescue us from.   
More importantly, its foundationalist privileging of fundamental ontology ignores 
the possibility that changes at a higher level, perhaps spurred by forward thinking 
human action, might be more epistemically and ontologically important for human 
history.  This includes the possibility that human action and constructive planning 
might be more crucial for the transformation of social hierarchies than waiting for the 
inevitable dramas of Being to save us.  This is the key innovation of thinkers like Zizek 
and Unger, who provide a more substantial account of human agency than what is 
found in Badiou’s work. Zizek’s criticisms of “traditional” Marxism’s mechanistic 
thinking discussed above applies with even greater force to Badiou’s own project.  He 
seems to understand his mathematical ontology as constitutive of reality prior to the 
emergence of a transformative Event. Badiou’s foundationalism has a Euclidean or 
Pythagorean quality to it, in that the character of reality, including for the subject, is set 
until there is an Evental window for genuine transformation.  This is an unusual 
position, combining the determinism of a mathematical formula to ontology with a 
mysticism which engenders a few rare historical opportunities for the constitutions of 
subjects who are capable of making real and concrete choices about the political 
contexts they will inhabit.  
This combination of mathematical foundationalism on the one hand and 
transformative Events on the other is both too rigid too mystical to address our political 
needs in the present day.  I hold that “men make their own history,”47 and while they 
might do so under certain contexts, it is better to put our faith in well-conceived 
strategy, normative and perspective argumentation, and palatable egalitarian principles 
than in the possibility of a transformative Event to come.  The latter seems too 
mystical, too foundationalist, and too enamoured with mathematical ontology while 
being divorced from humanity and the ongoing process of its history.  
This is where Badiou’s approach to politics becomes overly assertive, and not 
sufficiently grounded.  Trying to derive a specific political program from ontology, as 
has commonly been the case in Continental thought, is a somewhat suspicious activity.  
Most notably, it ignores many meta-ethical problems concerning how to make the 
move from discussing Being-qua-Being, to discussing ethics, and indeed political ethics, 
                                                          
47 See Karl Marx. The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, trans. (New York, NY. International Publishers, 
2008) 
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as a set of reason giving imperatives for undertaking certain actions.48  What I mean 
by this is that there seems to be something in the structure of ethical thought which 
gives the imperatives of ethics a quasi-independence from the world around them. One 
might call this an iteration of the old is/ought problem.  The natural world as it exists, 
as Being qua Being, can be dissected using the tools of philosophy and metaphysics. 
But it is not clear in what sense it provides a set of reason giving imperatives for actions 
which human beings should take.  Badiou seems to think that it does, since the 
structure of Being begets the Event.  But as mentioned before, this strikes me as rather 
mysterious. Why should human beings feel compelled to accept this structure as 
exhaustively conducive of ethics? Why should they not feel more involved in the 
constitution and consideration of ethics on a day to day basis. And indeed, to bring it 
back to the problem highlighted at the beginning of this section, what about more 
everyday problems which are not captured by the rather grand metaphysical account?  
 There is no space in this article to deal with these issues more extensively.  I raise 
them not because Badiouean answers cannot be given, but because I feel that they 
haven’t been.  This poses a significant problem to his account of politics.  To put it very 
simply, it is not clear why the structure of Being should also provide some structure to 
the nature of ethical and political thought. It seems clear that there must be some 
relation in the ultimate sense, since Being is the ultimate condition for the emergence 
of any ethics and politics at all. But the nature of this relationship may not be as 
straightforward as a simple throughline from Being, to Event, to fidelity, to freedom 
and equality.  For Badiou’s system to be successful, he or one of his disciples should be 
more attentive to fine details and less focused on broad theorizing. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I have attempted to present a sympathetic but critical treatment of 
Badiou’s politics, and draw some helpful connections to his metaphysics and broader 
philosophy. I have suggested that the largely critical dimension of his politics is helpful 
and even inspiring.  I agree wholeheartedly that we should move beyond democratic 
materialism and its limitations and embrace a more ambitious program for philosophy 
such as the one Badiou himself attempts to develop. I then go on to argue that Badiou’s 
own philosophy and politics has many insights of great interest. Unfortunately it also 
falls victim to a few limitations and questions which Badiou or Badioueans would need 
to answer if it is to be a comprehensive and intellectually complete philosophy. 
                                                          
48 This problem is related to, but distinct from, the issue raised at the beginning of this section about the 
tension between freedom and ethics.  
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I will end by providing a few prescriptions of my own.  I believe that there is much 
we can learn from Badiou’s thought when trying to conceive a more progressive politics 
and an affiliated ontology. As mentioned, the critical arguments he directs against 
democratic materialism and its skepticism are exceptionally helpful.  We should be less 
afraid of offering ambitious arguments about the politics and reality, and bolder in our 
speculations. Here Badiou’s work, whatever the merits of its substantive points, is an 
inspiration and an example to follow in the future. In other words, we should draw a 
great deal of inspiration from Badiou’s philosophical ambition while at least partially 
leaving behind the metaphysical baggage his system brings with it.   
And this is what I would like to end on.  I believe that we should follow the political 
thinking of dialectical philosophers such as Marx, Harvey, and Zizek, and combine 
their work with the more robust physical and mathematical ontological frameworks 
provided by authors like Roberto Unger and Lee Smolin. In tandem, these authors can 
provide a way of understanding reality as an ontological process wherein contingent 
objects and subjects emerge throughout time.  This emergence is not a mystical event, 
but something that can be understood by developing a sufficiently robust philosophical 
understanding of the process and tying it to the most cutting edge empirical research 
into the nature of time and mathematics. Finally, we can use this as a basis for 
developing a more robust conception of agency, and an affiliated account of what an 
egalitarian politics would look like.  Such a conception would not lean so heavily on 
the possibility of historical Events mechanistically emerging to enable broad social 
transformation. Instead it would provide a guide for how we should undertake more 
concrete actions in a future which remains continuously open to intervention and 
individual transformation. In a future paper, I hope to sketch all this out in 
considerably more detail.  
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